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1 Introduction
The emerging commercial domain of automated e- commerce represents an
exciting application area for researchers in MAS. It provides an ideal domain
in which to test concepts in agent to agent trade, negotiation, communication
and cooperation, [18].
However, little if any consideration has been given to the requirement for
guaranteed agent behaviour and overall security of the process. An implicit
assumption has been made that co-operative agents will co-operate in a benev-
olent manner.
As recent events have demonstrated, e.g. the Love Bug and distributed
denial of service attacks, the net is a hostile environment. In particular the
B2B domain requires very strong guarantees of robust behaviour, as failures
in security or performance can ripple through supply chains causing havoc.
The following two points illustrate the potential issues.
Attacks on Multi-Agent Systems
Assuming that companies will adopt MAS to manage B2Bsystems, then we
should expect such agents to be the target of malicious individuals. If agents
fail to implement adequate defensive behaviours then they will be vulnerable
to both manipulation and subversion. In addition, just because an agent has
c©2002 Published by Elsevier Science B. V.
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acquired access to an agent-trading environment does not imply that it is
altruistic and honest.
Attacks by Multi-Agent Systems
In addition, the beneﬁts of autonomous co-operative MAS for e-commerce
can also be used against host systems. For example a user may initiate multiple
agents, which launch a coordinated distributed denial of service attack against
a commercial system. The agents could be programmed to adapt in real-time
to the defensive strategies of the target agent or server. Such an attack would
be extremely diﬃcult to defend a system against. Clearly such an attack
would require substantial expert knowledge, although this is conceivable if
the potential rewards from subverting a corporate or defense organization
were high enough.
1.1 Mobile Multi-Agent Systems
The one area of MAS which has considered the issue of security is mobile
agents, where the need to protect agents and host servers from each other has
been clearly expressed [4,15]. If we can successfully demonstrate a strong so-
lution to system security in this context, then we can be conﬁdent in applying
such methods to the wider MAS ﬁeld.
1.2 Agents in Defense Applications
The MATRIX architecture provides the necessary features for the creation
of mobile agent applications that demonstrate a strong degree of security,
scalability and robustness. In particular the defense application area requires
the highest possible level of secure operation, which focused the systems design
and operation. The goals of the MATRIX architecture were to demonstrate
the secure use of mobile agents in the following areas:
• Information discovery within distributed multiple large- scale data sources.
• Integration of dynamic data sources at diﬀerent locations.
• Support for mobile computing including working during user disconnection.
The work initially involved identifying a number of scenarios against each
of the above areas in which mobile agents could be used within both military
and civil environments.
Mobile agents have been proposed as a means for providing a dynamic and
ﬂexible platform for a wide range of applications e.g. Network Management
[2], Distributed processing [10], and Mobile computing [16]. There are several
processes that can be assisted by mobile agent applications, i.e.:
• Reducing network load, [19].
• Overcoming network latency.
• Encapsulation of protocols.
78
• Executing asynchronously and autonomously.
• Dynamic adaptation. [17].
Within the defense domain the question of ensuring a robust and fault
tolerant system takes on even greater signiﬁcance, as it is a design requirement
that servers may be targets for an intentional physical attack. The ability of
mobile agents to relocate and rapidly reconﬁgure an application is therefore
extremely useful. In the business domain, malicious attacks on servers are
also an issue but via software, rather than explosives!
Unfortunately, signiﬁcant problems have limited the commercial deploy-
ment of mobile agents beyond the research stage. Speciﬁc problems include,
a lack of agreed inter-agent protocols and standards, the slow emergence of
suitable software and hardware and very poor security for mobile code.
The ﬁnal point in particular has been the major obstacle to the application
of mobile agent technology in the commercial world.
Section 2 reviews in greater detail why security is an issue in mobile agent
systems, while section 3 introduces the MATRIX architecture. Section 4 dis-
cusses the design pattern selected for the system and section 5 oﬀers details of
the MATRIX components. Sections 6 and 7 respectively provide some results
and future directions to this work. Section 8 oﬀers our initial conclusions.
2 Mobile Agent Security
Mobile agent security can generally be separated into two areas, protecting
the host from malicious agents and protecting the agent from malicious agents
and malicious hosts. Despite much research into the area [4,3,21], it is still a
matter of debate as to whether it is possible to protect an agent from malicious
servers. However, a certain amount of protection can be given to the agent,
in particular it is possible to protect the agent when it is in transit between
servers and to use encryption to protect information collected on an agent’s
travels. The Concordia Mobile Agent platform from Mitsubishi is one exam-
ple, which utilises encryption and user identities to oﬀer some agent security
[23].
The MATRIX system is focused on the issue of how to guarantee protection
of host servers against unauthorized or hostile agent behaviour. There is a
clear asymmetry in the security priorities of hosts and mobile agents as it is
the hosts, which are the sources of the data. This may also be application
dependent as in E-commerce applications the mobile agents may be carrying
critical customer data, which the owner of the agent values above any data
available at a remote server. Agent security is therefore critically connected
with the priorities and needs of the users.
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3 The Matrix
The MATRIX system is a two-part agent architecture, in which lightweight
mobile agents carry user generated tasks and messages between static agent-
based hosts. The host server agents provide service functions to the mobile
agents and isolate the mobile agents from the host’s data. The following
sections outline an application scenario and the system architecture in more
detail.
3.1 Intelligence Gathering Scenario
Consider the following scenario for a military intelligence battleﬁeld domain,
in which a tactical information gathering system is deployed over several units.
These are comprised of the following:
• Remote Intelligence Team (RIT)
• Platoon Control centre (PCC)
• Company Operations centre (Ops)
• Analysis and Control centre (ACC)
• Battalion Tactical Operations centre (BTOC)
These represent typical military intelligence units required in a battleﬁeld
domain, [Hofmann et al]. Several RIT units are deployed over a battleﬁeld
domain with command links as shown in ﬁgure 1.
RIT 
RIT 
RIT 
PCC 
OPS 
BTOC 
ACC 
Fig. 1. Example intelligence information integration scenario using mobile agents.
An RIT unit observes enemy movements in their sector and enters the data
and co-ordinates into their mobile terminal. The terminal software associates
the data with a mobile agent, which then waits for a radio link to the PCC unit.
A link becomes available and the agent moves to the PCC unit, and informs the
local Agent-port (agent host-server) that it has a high-priority data message.
The Agent-port authenticates the agents ID and opens an immediate radio link
80
to the OPS unit. The agent moves to OPS and after validation is allocated a
place in the OPS priority queue to await further processing or redirection. At
some point the agent is allocated priority and is pushed to the ACC unit where
the data is extracted and entered into the operational database.
An analyst in BTOC requests information regarding enemy movements
and launches several mobile agents to simultaneously query all available data
sources. Mobile agents move to OPS and the ACC servers and initiate requests
for new information on enemy movements. The OPS unit agent management
system decides that the task has suﬃcient priority to make a broadcast request
for fresh data to all PCC units. It generates several mobile agents, assigns
the search task to each and launches them in parallel to all PCC units via the
wireless network. On arriving at each PCC the agents query the local Agent-
port for fresh information and persist themselves to local storage, to await a
wake event when the local database has the requested data. Later an RIT unit
acquires new enemy movements and uploads these to the PCC via a mobile
agent. The PCC Agent-port recognises the requested data and sends a wake
signal to the relevant mobile agent. The agent stores the data and returns via
the OPS unit to BTOC and resolves the original analyst’s request.
This is a relatively simple scenario, which not only demonstrates the need
for standard mobile agent mechanisms such as agent mobility, communications
and resource access, but also emphasizes the need for compatibility with legacy
systems and support for unreliable, low bandwidth mobile computing.
3.2 Security Requirements
The following security features were a requirement within the example appli-
cation:
• Agent servers must perform mutual authentication before any communica-
tion takes place;
• All communication between agent servers must be encrypted;
• Agent attributes including, agent role, server of origin etc. must be authen-
ticated on arrival at each new server;
• An agents classes must be authenticated on arrival at each new server;
• Strict access control mechanisms must prevent agents from illegally access-
ing resources while connected to agent servers;
• An agent must be able to encrypt information collected on its travels.
Section 4 outlines how these requirements have been incorporated in the MA-
TRIX system and its overall architecture.
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4 Architecture
4.1 Mobile Agent Design Patterns
Researchers in mobile agent applications have adopted several design patterns.
Examples of these are:
• Single homogenous agents that transport all agent code and data, and move
between simple host servers, [3,5];
• Complex heterogeneous systems with specialised mobile agents, and multi-
ple services available at diﬀerent servers, [10];
• Two part systems with some functionality resident in the mobile agents and
a set of essential and common services resident in each host server, [13,20].
The ﬁrst approach oﬀers simplicity in design and reduces the load placed
on the host servers and complexity of the host software. However, it suﬀers
from major security problems, as the hosts are vulnerable to malicious agent
code.
The second design case allows a very ﬂexible distribution of agents, and
minimises the footprint of each agent as they only carry classes essential to
their speciﬁc task. It also allows for new agent types to be added to the system
as required. The disadvantages arise in terms of increased complexity of the
total system and more complex management of the interactions between the
agents. The third design case, of a two-part system appears to oﬀer the best
compromise between specialisation and simplicity and is the approach used in
the current architecture. It provides a number of speciﬁc advantages, which
are explained in the following sections.
4.2 Security
In the MATRIX architecture all classes used to access resources are actually
stored on the agent server and in order to request resources an agent must
pass a specially formatted list of requests and proposed interactions to the
server, (deﬁned as a Tasklist in the following section). It is important to note
that the mobile agents retain the ability to plan and process their list of tasks.
Only the ability to access local resources is removed from their code.
This approach has a number of advantages, ﬁrstly it is pointless for mali-
cious hosts to interrogate agents for data access routines as they contain none.
Secondly, the use of tasklists for requesting server resources introduces an ex-
tra layer of protection for the server. When a tasklist is passed to the server
to be processed it can be analysed to try and prevent valid but dysfunctional
agents from accessing services that they are not authorised to use. The mobile
agents access server resources via a standard interface, i.e. the tasklist, which
means all proprietary code for accessing resources can be stored on the server.
This greatly simpliﬁes the design of the agents and isolates code for access-
ing legacy systems aiding scalability and future development. It also reduces
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the footprint of the agents and therefore the impact they have on network load.
This reduction in network loading is a major advantage in the use of mobile
agents for mobile computing applications over low bandwidth communications
links.
Also, for a commercial grade Internet based system, we can not assume that
commercial servers will wish to share details on how to access their internal
data resources. Hence an agent from another company or individual should
only possess knowledge of the agreed message format, which can be publicly
available, to access server resources.
4.3 Message Based Communication
All communication within the MATRIX system, is achieved via the passing
of XML formatted messages. This includes the agent’s tasklist and all results
received back from a server as well as any agent to agent communication.
The message structure is derived from the FIPA ACL speciﬁcation [8], and an
example is shown in listing 1.
XML was chosen as a format following the work by Grosof and Labrou
[11] who suggest it as an encoding format for universal interoperability of
FIPA ACL and KIF. It is also a strongly emerging standard in the crucial
application area of B2B transactions and e-commerce.
<?xml version="1.0" ?>
<!DOCTYPE tasklist (View Source for full doctype...)>
<tasklist>
<task type="insert">
<insert>
<table>requisitions</table>
<column>demander</column>
<column>location</column>
<column>nsn</column>
<column>quantity</column>
<value>’btagent’</value>
<value>’btlabs’</value>
<value>4441</value>
<value>20</value>
</insert>
</task>
</tasklist>
Listing 1. Example tasklist request message.
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5 Matrix Components
5.1 Design Methodology
The general design principle of encapsulation has been applied to the design of
the mobile agents in the MATRIX system. Agent architectures and processes
can be complex, particularly when large numbers of agents are interacting in
real-time. The current design aims to modularise the internal components
of the agents and to create restricted input/output routes for data between
agents and external systems. Speciﬁcally the mobile agents have a compart-
mentalised internal structure, where all related functionality is grouped into
packages, termed component managers. Each manager handles a number of
internal classes and has the role of providing services based on those classes
to other component managers. Secondly, the architecture aims to minimise
interactions between the component managers, by making one manager co-
ordinate all service requests. The following sections describe the speciﬁcs of
each component manager for an agent and agent server.
5.2 Mobile Agent Components
The mobile agents in the system require a minimum set of functions to handle
data, security, and task selection, as illustrated in Figure 2.
 
Secure I 
Manager 
Encrypt
Itinerary 
Task Manager
Scheduler 
Security  Manager 
Task List Behaviou
Encrypted Public d 
Data  Manager 
Fig. 2. MATRIX mobile agent primary components
The Task Manager and Scheduler is the core reasoning process in the
agent, and handles task selection based on current inputs and the task list.
Among other things it controls the activity of a mobile agent at a foreign
agent server and handles requests from visualisation components to access the
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agent’s current location and status. It also handles requests from other com-
ponent managers for such things as access to security services, this helps to
maintain the compartmentalisation between component managers. The cur-
rent reasoning process is based on a relatively simple lookup table of reactive
behaviour scripts, which specify new sequences of behaviours. Future work
aims to incorporate a distributed Blackboard model [12] for more eﬃcient rea-
soning between alternative behaviours. The I/O Manager is responsible for
handling all agent communications.
The Data Manager is responsible for processing all internal data held by
the agent. It’s operation is normally driven by requests from the Task manager
to get or put data, with speciﬁed conditions such as the security level. The
Security Manager controls access to sensitive areas of the agent such as the
data stores.
5.3 Agent Server Components
Mobile agent systems normally require an agent server to be running on each
available host in the network that provides essential services to any visiting
itinerant agents. The name used for the agent server in the MATRIX system
is an ’Agent-port’. Cunningham and Somers [6] proposed a similar concept
using the term ’Agent airports’. Figure 3 shows the main components of the
Agent-port.
Resource 
Service 
Security Service 
Message Service Check-In Service 
Mobile Agent 
Agentport 
Local Databases 
User Interface 
Local Agent Manager 
Fig. 3. MATRIX host Agent-port components
The User Interface is the top-level component in the agent- port and pro-
vides management and visualisation functionality for the human user. It pro-
vides the interface for creating and tasking mobile agents and can display a
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visual representation of all mobile agents on the network. The Check-In is
an agents ﬁrst point of contact with the agent-port prior to arriving at a new
host. Before an agent can move to a new host it must remotely register with
the check-in service, which includes authenticating the agent. This is based
on an object called a passport, i.e. a digitally signed collection of agent at-
tributes including the agent’s classes. Once the passport has been successfully
veriﬁed by the agent-port the agent is allowed to move to the new host and
then receives a reference to a new local agent manager (deﬁned below). Once
an agent has been authenticated all interaction between an agent and agent
port occurs via the Local Agent Manager (LAM). There is one LAM per agent
and it manages such things as tasklist processing, sending messages between
agents, and requests for agent port resources, e.g. encryption services. The
Resource Service provides a generic interface to all local databases and legacy
systems on the local server. This has the advantage of making maintenance
simpler and locally controlled. The Security Service is responsible for main-
taining local public and private encryption keys and providing cryptographic
services. This includes authenticating an agent’s passport and granting per-
mission to contact other agents currently resident on the agent port. It also
includes verifying the tasks within an agent’s tasklist against a database of
allowed tasks for that particular agent role.
6 Results
An initial version of the MATRIX architecture has been implemented and an
example application built based on the scenario described in section 3.2. Mo-
bile agents are created in response to a users requests to retrieve or insert data
and then migrate to the most suitable servers on their itinerary and attempt
to fulﬁll the speciﬁed tasks, (in this example they retrieve defense related data
from three separate databases). The system has been implemented using Java
1.2, with Objectspace Voyager 1.3 providing support for agent mobility, direc-
tory services and SSL communication. A commercial encryption package for
Java (Entrust Toolkit version 4.51) is used to provide additional encryption
services although an alternative package could be plugged into the system,
with minimal modiﬁcation. The application is currently running on a local
network and successfully demonstrates operation within a database scenario
with a high degree of security including:
• SSL between hosts providing authentication and encryption services;
• Agent authentication based on the passport mechanism described in section
5.3;
• Access control through a combination of the Java sandbox and analysis of
the agent’s tasklist to determine which tasks the current agent is authorised
to carry out.
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The use of commercial oﬀ-the-shelf products in the work has raised some
important issues regarding security. Despite the suitability of Java for writing
mobile agent systems, the language provides very little in the way of resource
management and, therefore, there is currently little that can be done in the
way of preventing denial of service attacks. Similarly, while Voyager provides
the infrastructure for agents to easily travel around the network, it does not
provide the necessary degree of control over mobility required by a truly secure
application. For example, there appears to be no way to tell when a remote
object has arrived at the Voyager ORB on your local machine.
6.1 Tests
A preliminary series of tests have been conducted over a local area network,
using MATRIX to insert and recover data from several local databases. Each
individual mobile agent is currently 15 Kbytes in size, which is acceptable in
the ﬁxed network scenario but may require a reduction in size for operation
over low bandwidth wireless links, as required in the Intelligence gathering
scenario. Current work is being performed on the system to test for scalability
and robustness. In particular we need to measure the degree of performance
lost from using an indirect data access method. However, the defense scenario
outlined is one example application where robustness has the highest system
priority.
7 Future Work
Elements of the architecture, which are still to be implemented, include the
agent’s sensor manager and the ability to encrypt data collected by the agent.
In addition, certain security issues are still to be addressed, such as, if an au-
thenticated agent malfunctions there is currently nothing to stop it excessively
consuming system resources. One possible solution to this is through a credit
assignment scheme where agents have a ﬁnite store of virtual credit that they
can exchange for information resources.
Other work on security will include investigation into the following areas:
• Protection against denial of service attacks;
• Mechanisms for protecting agents against malicious hosts.
A broader area for investigation is to determine whether this architecture
is of value in securing static MAS. Clearly the security issues are diﬀerent as
static agent code can be held behind secure ﬁrewalls. However, whenever two
agents interact via communication channels they can inﬂuence each other’s
behaviour, which therefore raises a threat potential. Hence a major aspect
of security is distinguishing malicious from valid behaviours, as any smart
hostile agent will attempt to mimic valid agent’s behaviours. This problem is
also being addressed within the wider computer security ﬁeld using adaptive
immune system techniques, [14,1].
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7.1 Related Work
Existing work in the ﬁeld of MAS security has so far focused on the issues of
trust and authentication. In particular how to achieve: secure communication
channels, authentication of agents and accountability for agent’s actions. For
example Thirunavukkarasu et al [22], use a KQML system with message level
security features for privacy, authentication and non-repudiation. They also
adopt a method for secure message sequencing using a ﬁnite-state automaton
conversation model.
Wong & Sycara [24], address the same issues with a focus on securing
the agent name server (ANS) components of the MAS Retsina. They adopt
the assumption that the ANS are trusted entities. However, as Wong and
Sycara point out, the issue of a dishonest agent remains which may cheat other
agents. This opens a separate domain of accountability, which overlaps with
that of security but requires additional procedures at the reasoning level of an
agent. This problem will be of particular importance in any B2B application
as competing agents have the intrinsic objective of maximizing their gain in
any transaction.
8 Conclusions
The power of MAS is a double-edged sword that can raise the intelligence
and adaptability of complex software systems, yet at the same time enables
more sophisticated attacks on networks and IT systems. As with traditional
computer security services 100% protection is impossible, however with the
right design well managed agent behaviours enable a high degree of security
to be achieved. We believe the MATRIX architecture oﬀers a pragmatic and
scalable approach to resolve the security issue, which may be applied to other
MAS in general. An example application has been successfully built based on
a military logistics scenario involving a distributed database application. The
system provides the speciﬁed degree of security for use on a network of trusted
hosts. (The problem of accepting mobile agents from untrusted hosts has not
been addressed and remains an open issue). The architecture is based on a
two-part design where agents contain no knowledge of host server’s data access
methods but make requests for services via an XML formatted ACL message
protocol. This approach oﬀers signiﬁcant advantages in terms of improved
security, reduced network loading and interaction with legacy systems. These
capabilities should improve the acceptability of mobile agent technology to
commercial organisations.
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